Motivation Ethics

This is a book about a particular moral theory - motivation ethics - and why we should accept it. But it is also a book about moral theorizing, about how we might compare different structures of moral theory. In principle we might morally evaluate a range of objects: we might, for example, evaluate...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Coakley, Mathew (Author)
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: London New York Bloomsbury Academic 2017
Subjects:
Online Access:Click Here to View Status and Holdings.
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100 1 # |a Coakley, Mathew  |e author 
245 1 0 |a Motivation Ethics  |c MATHEW COAKLEY 
264 # 1 |a London  |a New York  |b Bloomsbury Academic  |c 2017 
264 # 4 |c ©2017 
300 # # |a 258 pages  |c 24 cm 
336 # # |a text  |2 rdacontent 
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338 # # |a volume  |2 rdacarrier 
504 # # |a Includes bibliographical references (pages [253]-256) and index. 
520 # # |a This is a book about a particular moral theory - motivation ethics - and why we should accept it. But it is also a book about moral theorizing, about how we might compare different structures of moral theory. In principle we might morally evaluate a range of objects: we might, for example, evaluate what people do - is some action right, wrong, permitted, forbidden, a duty or beyond what is required? Or we might evaluate agents: what is it to be morally heroic, or morally depraved, or highly moral? And, we could evaluate institutions: which ones are just, or morally better, or legitimate? Most theories focus on one (or two) of these and offer arguments against rivals. What this book does is to step back and ask a different question: of the theories that evaluate one object, are they compatible with an acceptable account of the evaluation of the other objects? So, for instance, if a moral theory tells us which actions are right and wrong, well can it then be compatible with a theory of what it is to be a morally good or bad or heroic or depraved agent (or deny the need for this)? It seems that this would be an easy task, but the book sets out how this is very difficult for some of our most prominent theories, why this is so, and why a theory based on motivations might be the right answer. 
546 # # |a Text in English 
650 # 0 |a Ethics 
650 # 0 |a Motivation (Psychology) 
650 # 0 |a Moral motivation 
650 # 0 |a Consequentialism (Ethics) 
650 # 0 |a Duty 
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